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Ohio Law on Wanton Torts
Elizabeth Boyer*
T WO RECENT CASES decided by the Supreme Court in 1963 and
1964 are of considerable interest in relation to decisions in-
volving wilful and wanton tort in Ohio since 1899. In the first
of these two cases, Botto et al., Appellants, v. Fischesser, a Minor,
et al., Appellees,' decided in 1963, the Supreme Court overruled
directed verdicts for the defendants in the trial court which had
been sustained in the appellate court, and remanded the cases
for jury trial with the comment that "the Guest Statute, being in
derogation of common law, should not be extended beyond its
reasonable limits. A court should exercise restraint in substitut-
ing its judgment for that of a jury and removing the case from
the jury by directed verdict."
This language seems to show a variance from the tone of the
court in past years, when directed verdicts in wilful and wanton
court cases have sometimes seemed to be the rule, rather than
the exception, as will be illustrated by a review of applicable
cases.
In the Botto case, plaintiffs alleged wilfulness and wanton-
ness on the part of Fischesser, a minor, in circumstances which
the court described as follows: "A 15 year old boy without a
driver's license, unauthorizedly appropriated his father's automo-
bile and took two minor companions for a ride; that he spun the
rear wheels of the car in gravel when starting, that he entered
two stop streets, known by him to be such, without stopping,
making two right-hand turns at a higher than safe speed in the
circumstances, causing the rear end of the car to swerve consid-
erably, over the protests of his companions, that he exhibited an
attitude of bravado; and that he finally smashed into a tree at a
speed of approximately 40 miles per hour near the second right
hand turn, thereby causing extensive damage to the front of the
automobile and injuring all three occupants."
The trial court directed the jury to return a verdict for the
defendant on the ground that no "wanton or wilful misconduct"
had been shown, and the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision
* Of Novelty, Ohio; member of the Ohio Bar; Special Counsel to the Attor-
ney General of Ohio.
1 174 Ohio St. 322 (1963).
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with one judge dissenting. It is to be noted that both lower
courts bound together the concepts of wilful and wanton tort, as
has previously been done more often than not, in Ohio courts.
The Supreme Court, however, in the Botto case, based its sylla-
bus 2 on wanton misconduct alone, in the following language:
"Wanton misconduct under the Guest Statute (Section 4515.02,
Revised Code) by the operator of a motor vehicle, may consist of
deliberately perverse behavior, with such reckless and inexcus-
able conduct in driving the vehicle as to endanger the safety of
the occupants therein."
The Court in its Syllabus 3 then stated: "A directed verdict
for the defendant at the close of plaintiff's case in chief in an
action to recover damages for personal injuries is improper and
a jury question is presented on the issue of wanton misconduct,
where plaintiff's evidence, construed most favorably to him,
shows . . ." the court then citing the set of facts earlier set forth
herein.
It is this latter unwillingness to sustain a directed verdict,
and the language involved in the opinion, which seems to impose
a duty on the lower courts to construe pleaded facts more favor-
ably to plaintiffs than has been the case in Ohio in recent years.
The decision in the Botto case is of especial interest because
in reaching its verdict the court cited the case of Tighe, a Minor,
Appellee, v. Diamond, et al., Appellants, 2 a 1948 case, and an-
other case in which the protection of the Guest Statute3 was de-
nied. In the Tighe case, also, the Minor Operators' Liability Stat-
ute4 was involved.
The Tighe case cited the Ohio Guest Statute at length in its
Syllabus 1, to show that either wilful or wanton misconduct must
be shown in all guest cases, and then went on, at Syllabus 2 to
establish that negligence, as called for in the "Minor Operators'
Liability Statute" could not be a factor, because of the pre-
existing and superseding requirements of the Guest Statute. The
court then went on to state that "wilful misconduct" alone must
be the basis for recovery in "Minor Operators'" cases, and that
such misconduct must be established as a proximate cause.
It is therefore to be assumed, apparently, that in reaching its
decision in the Botto case, the language of "wantonness" was
2 149 Ohio St. 520 (1948).
3 Rev. Code Ohio Sec. 4515.02.
4 Rev. Code Ohio Sec. 4507.07.
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol15/iss1/14
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used to bring the action within the Guest Statute but not the
Minor Operators' Statute.
The concept of "constructive knowledge" of surrounding
facts on the part of the defendant, instead of an unequivocal
pleading of actual knowledge of existing conditions as a require-
ment on the part of the plaintiff, was also first elucidated in the
Tighe case, where the court expanded on the definition in its
Syllabus 4 to include the words "under circumstances tending to
disclose that the motorist knows or should know that injury to
his guest will . . . result"; and at its Syllabus 5 the court said
that the question of whether the host "drove ... with knowledge,
actual or implied that injury ... would result ... is ... for the
jury." The facts in this case were that the defendant drove his
automobile over a railroad grade crossing which was four or five
feet higher than the road grade, at a speed of sixty miles per
hour, after telling his passengers beforehand that he was going
to "give them a thrill." He admitted that he had driven over
the crossing on about three previous occasions.
In the Tighe case, also, the problem of the Minor Operators'
Liability Statute made it necessary for the court to draw a sharp
distinction between "wilfulness" and "wantonness." These had
been merging into a more or less indistinguishable state, with
many interlocking decisions and many decisions combining the
two words, almost as one, previous to this case.
The Minor Operators' Statute, passed in 1943, provided that
the person signing the application for a driver's permit for a
minor under eighteen years of age, should be held liable for any
damages caused by the "negligence or wilful misconduct" of
such minor operator. It may be noted that there was a certain
lack of logic in omitting the word "wanton" if the aspect of both
intentional and inadvertent misconduct was to be embodied in
the law. The court, however, was under the necessity of dealing
with the law as it was drawn, and of seeking to separate the
terms by definition insofar as the wording of the Tighe case made
this necessary.
The court then defined wilful misconduct at Syllabus 3 and
Syllabus 4 of the Tighe case to include the factors of "intent or
purpose to do wrong," "intentional deviation from clear duty,
with intent to injure," or "with full knowledge of existing con-
ditions the intentional execution of a wrongful course of conduct,
which he knows should not be carried out," or "the intentional
Jan., 1966
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failure to do something which he knows should be done in con-
nection with his operation of the automobile under the circum-
stances, tending to disclose that the motorist knows or should
know that an injury to his guest will be the probable result of
such conduct."
This latter language is of especial interest when one considers
its applicability to the facts of the Botto case, where both wan-
tonness and wilfulness were cited and considered by the trial
and appellate courts, but where the Supreme Court in its syllabi
mentioned only wantonness. It is apparent that in the Tighe case
in this wording the court has included most of the factors which
had previously constituted "wilful and wanton misconduct" into
a definition of "wilful misconduct." In doing so, the court care-
fully stated in both Syllabus 3 and Syllabus 4 that the definitions
apply to the "Guest Statute" and to the "Minor Operators' Li-
ability Statute," however, most courts have since applied them
indiscriminately to cases where the word "wilful" is used,
whether or not the facts of the case brought it under either of
these two statutes.
In the Botto case, interestingly enough, the court includes
much of the concept of constructive scienter previously embodied
into the definitions of "wilful misconduct" into its definition of
"wanton misconduct."
The element of failure after knowledge of danger to use ordi-
nary care to avoid injury, which was first stated in the case of
Payne, Director General of Railroads, v. Vance,5 decided in 1921,
was also cited by the court in Kellerman, Admx., Appellant, v.
the J. S. Durig Co., Appellee,6 a 1964 case. The Payne case has
been followed many times. The concept of duty to use ordinary
care after knowledge of danger is not included in the definition
of wilfulness in the Tighe case. However, since the Payne case
was a non-Guest-Statute case, and contained allegations of wan-
tonness as well as of wilfulness, it cannot be assumed, appar-
ently, that "failure after such knowledge (of danger to the safety
of others) to use ordinary care to avoid injury" has been elimi-
nated from the requirements for a showing of "wanton or wilful
misconduct" except as to cases under the "Guest Statute" and
the "Minor Operators' Liability Statute," where the Tighe case
5 103 Ohio St. 59 (1921).
6 176 Ohio St. 320 (1964).
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would govern, augmented by the Botto case decision, based on
wantonness alone.
The two words "wilful" and "wanton" are used in conjunc-
tion with each other in so many cases in Ohio, that while they are
not congruent on all points, they have been very closely inter-
related and interlocked by decisions and fact findings.
This merging began in the case of Schweinfurth, Admr. v.
G. C. C. & St. Louis Railway Co.,7 decided in 1899 and still ruling
case law in Ohio, where the court held that both charges (of wil-
fulness and wantonness) could be combined in a single cause of
action. Considering the term "wantonness" separately for pur-
poses of clarity in tracing case decisions, however, we find that
there are seven rather distinct factors which must be found to
exist before legal "wantonness" can be established. Two of these
are stated, by necessity, in the negative. They are as follows, in
the order of their establishment as ruling case law: a knowledge
of plaintiff's danger, with conscious indifference to the conse-
quences; ill will not being a necessary factor; simple violation of
a statute not being sufficient; entire want of care a requisite; dis-
position to perversity must be established; the tortfeasor must
be conscious and aware that his conduct will in all common
probability result in harm to another; and he must have had a
conscious and timely knowledge of the approach to danger.
These constitute a very interesting yardstick when applied to
the Botto case, especially the "simple violation of a statute"
provision, which has been invoked so many times, and in aggra-
vated circumstances in a number of cases.
The factor of intoxication, not at issue in the Botto case, in
the general run of Ohio cases in both wilful and wanton mis-
conduct, has been given little weight.
In the case of Payne, Director General of Railroads v. Vance,
previously mentioned, a grade crossing matter was concerned.
The plaintiff sought to escape the consequences of his own con-
tributory negligence in venturing onto a railroad crossing while
a train was approaching, by alleging a number of counts of
"wilful and wanton misconduct" on the part of the railroad in its
mode of maintaining the crossing and operating its trains across
it. This case was decided for the most part with regard to the
allegations of "wilfulness," but some discussion of "wanton mis-
conduct" appears in the opinion, and the court included at its
7 60 Ohio St. 215 (1899).
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eighth syllabus the following statement: "An instruction to the
jury which attempts to define wilful acts or wantonness, which
does not include the element of defendant's knowledge of plain-
tiff's danger, or such conscious indifference to consequences as
would be the equivalent of wilful and intentional injury, is
erroneous."
This doctrine was modified with regard to "wilful" mis-
conduct in the Tighe case, where the words "knows or should
know," are used, but Syllabus 4, embodying this wording, is
applied only to "wilful misconduct . . . under the 'guest statute'
and the 'minor operator's liability statute'," so that the more
positive requirement of the wording in the Payne case must be
regarded, at this juncture, as prevailing when wantonness is at
issue.
The fact that ill will on the part of the tortfeasor is not a
necessary factor in cases involving wantonness was stated in
Higbee Company v. Jackson,8 and was expanded as follows in
the third syllabus of that case: "To constitute wanton negligence,
it is not necessary that there should be ill-will toward the per-
son injured, but an entire absence of care for the safety of
others which exhibits indifference to consequences, establishes
legal wantonness."
This concept was reiterated in Syllabus 8 of the Payne case,
and in Reserve Trucking Company v. Fairchild.9 This latter
case, incidentally, is cited as to its syllabi 2 and 4 in the Keller-
man case, and has been followed many times in Ohio.
The statement that "the simple violation of a statute is not
sufficient" for a showing of legal wantonness is likewise first
found in the Higbee case at Syllabus 4. It is there stated that
"The question whether there was such (wilful and wanton)
negligence, and if so whether it was the proximate cause of
injury in a particular case is one of fact to be determined by the
jury." This was a 1920 case, but in subsequent years, prior to
the Botto case, the court had been ruling such cases as not for
the jury in a wide variety of instances.
However, the statement that "the simple violation of a stat-
ute" does not constitute wantonness appears in either the syllabi
or the opinion of most cases where wantonness coupled with the
violation of a statute appears. Among these is the case of Mc-
8 101 Ohio St. 75 (1920).
9 128 Ohio St. 519 (1934).
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Coy, Admr. v. Faulkenberg'° at syllabus 2. The fact that viola-
tion of specific types of statutes does not constitute wantonness
is cited in a wide variety of instances. The statement that "ex-
cessive speed in itself is not sufficient" to constitute legal wanton-
ness appears at syllabus 1 in the case of Morrow v. Hume,
Admx.," a 1936 case which has been followed many times. In
this case the driver was "going 75 or 80 miles per hour," so that
if we accept this as a "simple violation" of a statute, we must
probably assume that the extent or degree of violation of one
statute, in the view of the court which decided the Morrow case,
did not preclude such violation from being "simple." The de-
cision in the Botto case, which concerned a speed of about 40
miles per hour, is an interesting contrast to the Morrow case.
A violation of the "assured clear distance" rule has been
held not to constitute legal wantonness in several appellate cases:
that of Fischer v. Faflik,12 where the driver drove through fog
and struck a truck in the rear; Schulz, Appellee v. Fible, Appel-
lant,13 where the driver disregarded remonstrances and drove
through dense vapor, striking the car ahead of him, both of
which cases have since been followed several times. This view
was also taken in the case of Johnson, Appellee v. Gernon, Jr.,
Appellant,14 where the driver continued driving after his glasses
had been brushed off his nose, although he could not see with-
out them. All three of the above were "Guest Statute" cases,
resulting in directed verdicts for defendants.
On the other hand, in the case of Jenkins, Appellee v. Sharp,
Appellant,15 also a guest case, and cited in the Kellerman and
Botto cases, the question of whether a defendant's driving
through a "stop" light constituted legal wantonness was held to
be one of fact for the jury.
The requirement of a showing of "entire absence of care"
before legal wantonness can be found, is first stated in the case
of Higbee v. Jackson, previously cited, at Syllabus 3, which
states ". . . an entire absence of care for the safety of others,
10 53 Ohio App. 98 (1935).
11 131 Ohio St. 319 (1936).
12 52 Ohio App. 69 (1936).
1 71 Ohio App. 353 (1943).
14 91 Ohio App. 529 (1947).
15 140 Ohio St. 80 (1942).
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which exhibits indifference to consequences, establishes legal
wantonness."
This syllabus, quoted in Reserve Trucking Company v. Fair-
child, previously cited, involves a change of wording, as follows:
"The term 'wanton negligence' implies the failure to exercise
any care for those to whom a duty of care is owing, when the
wrongdoer has knowledge of the great probability of harm to
such persons which the exercise of care might avert, and exhibits
a reckless disregard of consequences."
In syllabus 6 of the same case, the court stated: "It is error
to charge a jury that 'in order to establish wantonness, it is not
necessary to show an entire want of care'." In other words, any
vestige of care must have been shown to be lacking. It is interest-
ing to note that the 1964 Kellerman case reverts to the wording
"failure to exercise any care."
The concept has also been cited many times in both opinions
and syllabi, one such instance being an appellate decision, that
of Cousins v. Booksbaum, 6 for example, which states as its first
syllabus: "Wanton misconduct within the purview of Section
6308-6 G. C. (the then Guest Statute citation) is proven only
when the jury concludes by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant failed to exercise any care," and in Rupright
v. Burns, 7 an appellate case decided in 1947, which held in its
syllabus 2 that "wanton negligence implies a failure to exercise
any care." In a preponderance of these cases, verdicts were di-
rected for defendants.
The Higbee case and the Reserve case, while they have been
cited on the above concept in many "Guest Statute" cases, were
not themselves "guest" cases.
Therefore, the doctrine of "failure to exercise any care"
arose in non-"guest-statute" cases, but is often applied to "guest
statute cases," as in Rupright v. Burns and Cousins v. Books-
baum, previously cited. This results in a somewhat forced ap-
plication of the words "lack of any care." It may be remarked
that it is impossible to drive a motor vehicle without "any" care,
unless one were to start it off, take his hands off the wheel, and
let it go where it would. Thus the indiscriminate citing of "Guest
Statute" syllabi in non-"guest-statute" cases, and vice versa,
brings about some rather odd constructions of the law.
16 51 Ohio App. 150 (1935).
17 82 N. E. 2nd 330 (Ohio App. 1947).
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The most recent case in the field of wanton misconduct, that
of Kellerman v. the J. S. Durig Co., previously cited, is a 1964
case, and does not involve the Guest Statute nor the Minor
Operators' Liability Statute. In the Kellerman case, the plain-
tiff's decedent drove his car into the rear end of defendant's un-
lighted truck, the end of which was in his path on a two-lane
highway. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant
under the ruling in Universal Concrete Pipe Company v. Bas-
sett,"' a 1936 case which has become ruling case law in cases
involving violations of the assured clear distance statute. The
court cited, also, the case of Smiley v. Arrow Spring Bed Co.' 9
on assured clear distance, together with several similar cases, and
allowed no recovery. The appellate court affirmed this judgment
without written opinion. The Supreme Court overruled the trial
and appellate courts, citing Durham v. the Warner Elevator
Manufacturing Company,20 with the statement that the "Court
must construe evidence most strongly in favor of a party against
whom the motion (in effect a demurrer to the cause of action in
this case) is made, and where there is substantial competent evi-
dence to support his side of the case on which reasonable minds
may reach different conclusions, the motion must not be denied."
In its syllabus 2 of the Kellerman case, the Court stated:
"Wanton misconduct charged against a defendant implies a dis-
position to perversity and a failure to exercise any care toward
those to whom a duty of care was owing when the probability
that harm would result from such failure was great and such
probability was actually known, or in the circumstances ought
to have been known, to the defendant."
The court distinguished the Kellerman case from the Univer-
sal Concrete Pipe case, since in that case the defendant's em-
ployee "left his truck unattended but properly parked for only
a few minutes," while in the Kellerman case "the truck extended
five feet or more into the road and the driver passively allowed
it to so remain for an hour or longer, unlighted, after darkness
had set in, and with no warning signals whatsoever, when he
knew or should have known that such a situation created an
extreme danger and hazard for the drivers of motor vehicles
using the road." The court remarked that "In the opinion of the
18 130 Ohio St. 567 (1936).
19 138 Ohio St. 81 (1941).
20 166 Ohio St. 31 (1956).
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majority of this Court such conduct is found to have occurred
as would amount to a 'disposition to perversity' and a complete
lack of care toward those to whom a duty of care existed, and
would warrant the finding that the employee (truckdriver) was
chargeable with wanton misconduct and that the evidence was
such as to require submission of the case to the jury on the issue
of wanton misconduct . . ." in the circumstances.
In this late court's view of the attitude of mind constituting
a "disposition to perversity" one can detect a more stringent
view than that which has obtained in courts in the past, which
have not been disposed to find a "disposition to perversity" un-
der far more aggravated sets of facts.
In the Kellerman case the court also cited Section 4511.21 of
the Revised Code as to "assured clear distance," and distin-
guished the Universal Concrete Pipe case in this regard in the
following words: "The combined derelictions charged to the
defendant, if determined to be true with attaching liability, show
a reckless and inexcusable disregard of the rights and protec-
tion of others and tend to differentiate this case from other cases
where the assured clear distance ahead statute was applied to
defeat the plaintiff."
The court then went on to state in its syllabus 3: "where
wanton negligence on the part of a defendant existed, negligence
on the part of the plaintiff is not available as a defense."
It will be noted that the court in the Kellerman case, how-
ever, still clings to the "disposition to perversity" doctrine, con-
struing it favorably to the plaintiff, however, whereas previously
it has more often been found as a stumbling block to plaintiffs,
and has resulted in failures of proof.
The "disposition to perversity" doctrine, while it has been
a prime consideration for showings of wantonness since the Uni-
versal Concrete Pipe decision, has been criticized by students of
law,21 and while it has been annotated and quoted by the digest
services as showing of Ohio law, no other state has adopted it.
The Universal Concrete Pipe case, also, is a non-"guest stat-
ute" case which is consistently cited in "Guest Statute" actions.
In the Universal Concrete Pipe case the truck driver, as the
Court in the Kellerman case observed, had stopped his truck be-
side the road at night to go into a house and inquire directions.
Another driver came along and drove into the truck from the
21 10 Cinc. L. Rev. 485 (1936).
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rear. The charge of wantonness was directed, not against the
driver who struck the parked truck, but against the truck driver
for so parking his vehicle.
It is obvious from these facts, that while the parking may
have been negligent, it could hardly have been held "wanton"
under the definitions existing in Ohio at that time or since. The
characterization of the facts as "wantonness" by the plaintiff
was an effort, as the court observed, to hurdle his own violation
of the "assured clear distance" statute. The court held that the
truck driver was not required under the law to anticipate that
the plaintiff, or one in like position, would not keep his car un-
der control, and would violate this statute, and that only if he
was required to so anticipate, then he was guilty of wanton mis-
conduct. 22 This is good law, and it is to be regretted that the
court then saw fit to write its second syllabus, stating that "wan-
ton misconduct is such conduct as manifests a disposition to
perversity, and it must be under such surrounding circumstances
and existing conditions that his conduct will in all common
probability result in injury." The court elucidated its view on
"perversity" with the words "wantonness is a synonym for what
is popularly known as 'cussedness' and cussedness is a disposi-
tion to perversity." 23
In the Kellerman case, the court distinguished the Universal
Concrete Pipe case, as quoted above, and found that the parking
truck driver, in parking his truck so that it extended into the
lane of travel, was guilty of wantonness, in that he should have
anticipated that the surrounding circumstances would in all
likelihood result in injury to other drivers to whom a duty of
care was owing.
This the court interpreted as a "disposition to perversity,"
but a review of earlier Ohio cases will show that this is quite
a departure from earlier decisions.
In the case of Masters v. New York Central Railroad,24 de-
cided in 1947, the Supreme Court ruled that no "disposition to
perversity" was shown on the part of a defendant railroad in
starting a train before an off-duty trainman could get on, so
that he attempted to board the moving train and was injured.
This was not, of course, a guest statute case.
22 130 Ohio St. 567 (1936).
23 Ibid., at 573.
24 147 Ohio St. 293 (1947).
Jan., 1966
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The doctrine of "disposition to perversity" has been freely
and indiscriminately applied to guest statute cases by the Su-
preme Court, as in Jenkins v. Sharp, previously cited, and in
Hellern, Admx., v. Dixon 5 where three judges found defendant's
conduct not to show a "disposition to perversity" and two judges
worded a strong statement of dissent, all citing the authority of
the Universal Concrete Pipe case and the Masters v. New York
Central definition. In the Helleren case the element of intoxica-
tion entered into the facts of a case involving highly reckless
driving, which was decided in the Supreme Court in 1949. The
court remarked in its statement of facts that while the driver
had one bottle of beer on the way, and three glasses of beer on
the return trip, "no claim was made in the petition or at the trial
that the defendant was intoxicated." 26 The court then made no
further reference to intoxication. This situation is interesting
since the facts then showed that the driver drove, by his own
statement, "as fast as the car would go," in heavy rain, with
the windshield wiper not working, onto the berm of the road for
a distance of 150 feet, while sinking into the mud of the berm,
whereupon he struck a culvert with great impact, killing plain-
tiff's decedent. The court held that "there was no substantial
evidence tending to prove the death of the decedent was caused
by the wilful or wanton misconduct of the defendant" 27 and
that the trial court should have directed the verdict for the de-
fendant. This was a guest statute case, and the court may have
felt that the plaintiff guest-passenger assumed the risk of know-
ingly riding with such a host driver, although no statement on
this point is found in the opinion. The facts, however, make an
interesting contrast to those of the Botto case, where an opposite
decision was reached.
Bound up in the same syllabus with the "perversity" doc-
trine in the Universal Concrete Pipe case is another factor, some-
times cited separately: that "The party doing the act or failing
to act must be conscious, from his knowledge of surrounding
circumstances and existing conditions that his conduct will in
all common probability result in injury." 28 This language is con-
sidered as being distinguished by the Kellerman case, but pre-
25 152 Ohio St. 40 (1949).
26 Id. at 42.
27 Id. at 48.
28 130 Ohio St. 567 at 568.
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viously this subjective requirement, taken in conjunction witb
the requirement of a "disposition to perversity" cited earlier in
the same syllabus, seems to require the commission of a quite
deliberate, malicious and knowledgeable act. Such an act had
heretofore been the province of the wilful tort. This latter part
of the second syllabus in the Universal Concrete Pipe case has
also been applied in guest statute cases such as the Helleren case
and in Rupright v. Burns.
2 9
In the case of Miljak, Appellee v. Boyle, Appellant,30 also a
guest case, the court in construing the "perversity" doctrine
stated in its second syllabus that "a disposition to perversity,
standing alone, is not sufficient to establish wanton miscon-
duct." 31
The court then went on to follow a requirement set up in
Rupright v. Burns, previously cited, that the tortfeasor must
proceed into the presence of danger, with indifference to con-
sequences, and with absence of all care, notwithstanding his
conscious and timely knowledge of an approach to unusual
danger, and the common probability of injury to others." 32
The facts of the Rupright case involved a host driver who
drove at a high speed over a road which had repeated "dips"
and rises. On coming over such a rise he came up suddenly be-
hind a car which was going rather slowly. He endeavored to cut
around it into the left lane, saw a pedestrian there, and cut back
into the right lane, striking the other car. The court ruled for
the defendant, finding none of the above cited factors present in
the fact situation.
The court in the Miljak case, previously cited, held that
"failure or inability of a jury to find the existence of a conscious
and timely knowledge by the defendant of an approach to un-
usual danger, absence of all care on his part, and an indifference
to consequences which the exercise of care would avert, is
equivalent to a finding against the party having the burden of
establishing wanton misconduct." 33
The facts in the Miljak case were that the defendant had
been driving at 70 miles per hour on a heavily traveled winding
29 82 N. E. 2d 330 (Ohio App. 1947).
30 93 Ohio App. 169 (1952).
31 Ibid.
32 82 N. E. 2d at 331 (Ohio 1947).
33 93 Ohio App. 169 (1952) at Syllabus 4.
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road in a built-up section. His passengers remonstrated with
him a number of times, but he kept on at the same speed. He
then struck a concrete divider and the car went into a ditch. The
jury found for the plaintiff. The court held that the jury had
failed to include a specific finding on "consciousness of danger"
or of the unusually dangerous situation. The court then cited
the Masters case, previously cited, and entered final judgment
for the defendant. The court therefore construed the facts cited
as not showing wantonness under Ohio law.
To sum up the requirements which the various holdings of
the courts have set forth, as necessary findings before legal
wantonness can be found, is to realize that a showing of each of
these would be all but impossible. To recapitulate: the tortfeasor
must "know" of plaintiff's danger and act with "conscious" in-
difference to the consequences; he need not have had ill will, and
"simple violation of a statute" will not make him chargeable;
but he must have shown an "entire want of care"; his "dispo-
sition to perversity" must be established; he must be "aware and
conscious" that his conduct will in all common probability result
in harm to another, and he must have a "conscious and timely
knowledge" of the approach of danger. Taken together, these
attitudes of mind seem to spell out a fairly premeditated and
deliberate course of conduct, rather than the "devil-may-care"
attitude associated with "wantonness" in the lay mind, in early
Ohio law and in the law of other jurisdictions.
It would seem that this vague and yet categorical set of re-
quirements is more likely to confuse a jury, and even a court,
than it is to assist them in making a decision with regard to an
ordinary tort situation. The decisions in the Kellerman and
Botto cases seem to evidence a swinging of the pendulum against
directed verdicts in cases involving wanton tort. If future de-
cisions of our present Supreme Court can bring greater balance
and clarification in this area of Ohio law, it will indeed help to
resolve what has become a very inconsistent situation.
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol15/iss1/14
